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Introduction 
Political scienlists and political sociologists have long examined the types of 
organizational actors that dominate the U S. policy-making process. One such policy-
making model developed during the 1950s and 1960s is the “iron triangle”model This 
model supposes that US. policy making in any particular policy domain is dominated by 
collaborations among three types of organizational actors: congressional 
committees/subcommittees, executive agencies, and special mterest groups (Adams 
1984). Some have referred to iron triangles as a“subsystem”（Freeman 1955, 5), a 
“subgovernment”（Carter 1964), or a“cozy litle triangle”（James 1969, 126) Jordan 
(1981, 96) defined iron triangles as: 
An image developed m the United States m the 1950s and 1960s to describe how 
decision making was segmented to d1f日erentarenas. Decisions . were seen as taking 
place m“triangles”composed of (I) the interest group(s), (2) the relevant 
administrative agency and (3) the relevant Congressional committees Access to 
these triangles was dificult: even the Presidency or departmental head had difficulty 
impinging on these private worlds. 
Thus, the iron triangle m吋elsuggests that U.S. policy m誼ingm a particular domain is 
controlled by small, exclusive alliances of three types of organizational actors, which are 
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mostly autonomous仕・omother power holders 
One mam reason why these three types of actors allegedly form exclusive alliances 
is that the alliances constitute mutually beneficial relationships for the triangle actors 
That is, each individual actor has material advantages to 呂田nby suppoはingeach triangle 
actor’s interests and by excluding other actors from participating in the policy-making 
process 
This conjunction of forces fostered mutual self-help relationships: legislators 
enhanced reelection chances by approving and expanding budgets of programs 
likely to benefit constituents; agency personnel watched their organizations and 
influence grow as well as their independence from presidential direction; and 
interest groups helped legislators and bureaucrats alike while winning particularistic 
benefits (Pika 1983, 302). 
Because of such mutually beneficial問lauonsh1ps,members of iron triangles supposedly 
form closed, united groups 
In spite of the initial pnpularity of the iron triangle model, later scholars criticized 
the model. Recio (1978, 88) claimed，“the iron triangle concept is not so much wrong as 
it is disas汀ouslyincomplete”Recio provided an alternative policy making model issue 
networks. This model，“the most commonly cited alternative to a subgovernment” 
(McCool 1990, 290), suggests that a great variety of actors are involved in policy-
making, representing different kinds of interests Recio described the difference between 
iron triangles and issue networks: 
Iron tnangles and subgovemments suggest a stable set of p副 icipantscoalesced to 
control fairly narrow public programs. . Issue networks are almost the reverse 
image in each respect Participants move in and out of the networks constantly. 
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Rather than groups umted in dominance over a program, no one . tS in control of 
the polices and issues (Heclo 1978, I 02) 
Thus, according to the issue network model, a large number of orgamzational actors, 
beyond the types acknowledged by the iron triangle model, participate in public policy-
making in the U.S., and membership m these networks is unstable, changing over 
different policy issues Since no small stable set of actors controls policy making, policy 
outcomes are supposedly unpredictable (Kmgdon 1984) 
Another alternative to the iron triangle model is Sabatier's model of advocacy 
coalitions. According to Sabatier (1993, 24), advocacy coalttions include not only the 
trtangle actors but also '.journaltsts, analysts, researchers, and others who play important 
roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluatton of policy ideas as well as actors at 
other levels of government.”Although this model appears similar to Heclo’S issue 
networks, Sabatier's model pr吋ectsan image of more stable coalitions than issue 
networks. Sabatier (1993, 27) argued: 
The lineup of alies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade 
or so. Thus the framework explicitly r吋ectsthe view that actors are primarily 
motivated by their short term self-interest and thus that“coalition of convenience” 
。fhtghly varymg composition will dominate policy making over time. 
A recent study concerning iron triangles was conducted by Salisbury et al (1992). 
Salisbury et al. (1992) exammed agnculture, energy, health, and labor policy domains to 
see whether iron triangles existed in these domains. They mvestigated social 
characteristics, parttSanships, policy specializations, and contacts between public officials 
and lobbyists. In their analysis, they did not discover characteristics of iron triangles in 
any of the above four町田SSalisbury et al. (1992, 149) argued，“we need more complex 
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images to catch the protean richness and complexity of the emerging systems of interest 
representation and policy making. 川り
Using the same data set mentioned above, Heinz et al. (1993) mapped out networks 
of lobbyists into spheres, and found that the maps in the four domains are characterized 
by “hollow cores，＇’indicating that no inner circle exists which acts as a dominant broker 
in al issues. The Implication IS that there is no core group of actors controlling U.S. 
policy making.山 Theyfurther d即日dthe presence of iron triangles even m niches in 
these domains because niches are stricken with a high level of con日ict,especially in the 
agriculture and labor domains: 
The specialized policy mches that exist in the agnculture and labor domains are not 
iron triangles where the interest groups and their agency sponsors coexist in a 
harmonious, symbiotic relationship. Rather, these niches would appear to be 
specialized arenas of conflict where pitched battles a回 fought(Heinz et al. 1993, 
217). 
Scholars attribute vanous factors to the decline of iron triangles Heclo (1978) 
pointed to the expansion of government activities, resulting in the mobihzation of more 
different types of interest groups knowledgeable about policy Issues. Gais, Peterson, and 
Walker (1984) argued that iron tnangles are becoming less common because of the 
inroads made by Citizen groups. They stated，“By mobilizing supporters and making 
efforts to move conflicts into broader political arenas whenever possible, the citizen 
groups dimimshed the autonomy of subgovernments, made policy outcomes less 
predictable, and forced the policy debate into forums open to public view”(1984, 183). 
Jones, who studied the energy policy domain, claimed，“the energy policy triangles came 
to be threatened in the 1960s by environmental groups”(1979, 104). According to 
Salis burγ （1990), however, 1t was not just citizen groups but also various pol耐cally
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active organizations that made iron triangles a less common phenomenon Cigler and 
Loomis (1991) attributed the decline of iron triangles to many other factors including 
some institutional factors such as“cong問団ionalfragmentation, budget defi口ts,and 
enhanced representation of interests”(1991, 388). 
In spite of the common observation that iron triangles may be less often seen in 
today’s U S pohcy-making, some other scholars suggested that iron tnangles do exist 
Adams (1984) argued that U.S. defense policies are controlled by exclusive members of 
an iron triangle: defense contractors, the defense department, and key members of 
Congress. Rtpley and Franklin (1980) believed that iron triangles tend to dominate m 
“distributive policies，”which refer to policies which 剖locategovernment procurement or 
subsidies to particular organizations for special projects. Other scholars such as King and 
Shannon (1986) and Gormley (1986) also suggested that iron tnangles exist. 
This article attempts to answer this apparent contradictton in research findings. I 
argue that the absence of organized opposition is the key to understanding where iron 
triangles are likely to dominate policy making. Because of mutual benefits that accrue 
from iron triangles, triangle actors (congressional committees, government agenci田，and
interest groups) tend to naturally form close working relationships Therefore, unless 
opposing alliances attempt to check their influences, the triangle actors’m日uencesmay 
become dorr】inant
In order to examine this relationship between organized opposition and iron 
triangles, thts article examines the labor policy domain in the 1980s, a domain known to 
be stricken by a high level of conflict (Salisbury et a/. 1987) This article will show that 
even in the contentious labor policy domain, basic structures of a possible iron triangle 
do exist, that is, a stable set of triangle actors work together in an attempt to control 
p叶icy-makingHowever, consistent counter lobbying activities by opposing alliances 
prevent triangle actors from completely controlling the policy making 
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Criteria oflron Triangles 
The operational criteria for iron triangles need to be clarified so that their presence 
can be objectrvely verified. I a田umethat an iron triangle exists m a policy don】ain,if an 
alliance of organizational actors meets the following criteria: 
(I) An alliance includes th回edistmct types of o昭anizat1ons:an interest group, an 
executive agency, and a congressional committee a triangle alliance. 
(2) An alliance consists of a stable set of participants acro田 multiplepolicy events 
within a policy domain-a stable alliance. 
(3) Members of an alliance control policy outcomes-a dominant alliance. 
As the first criterion stat田， foran alliance to be cons1de田dan iron tnangle, 1t needs to 
include at least an interest group, an executive agency, and a congressional committee. 
The presence of such actors is the basic requirement for an iron triangle. An alliance 1s 
referred to as a “triangle alliance" if its members include al three parties. 
Although a triangle alliance has the potentrnl to become an iron triangle, meeting 
only the first criterion does not make an alliance an iron triangle. The second criterion for 
iron triangles is that the alliance includes a stable set of members for a series of policy 
events. By definition, iron triangle actors tend to work together on multiple events in a 
policy don】ain.The same actors should appear repeatedly collaborating on multiple, 
related bils. Thus, there needs to be some constancy of the alliance membership 
Thirdly, meeting only the first and second criteria does not make an alliance an 1ron 
tnangle In addition, iron triangles must control policy outcomes. In other words, iron 
triangles have to win al policy fights with al actors working together to protect or 
further their interests Thus, opposmg alliances, if they exist, should not be able to defeat 
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iron汀ianglesin a policy fight. If an alliance of policy acio<s meet these three cnteria, it 
constitutes an iron triangle because three types of stable actors completely dommate the 
policy-making process. 
Data 
Data analyzed in this article come from the U.S. National Labor Poltcy Project 
conducted by David Knoke in 1988.同 Bylookmg for organizational appearances in four 
sources (congress10nal hearings, the New York Times labor abstracts, labor lobby 
reg1stratt0ns, and Supreme Court am1cus curiae briefs), Knoke found that mo肥 thanone 
thousand organizattons were involved in mfluencing labor polici田 between1981 and 
1987. From this population of organizations, he chose, as hts target sample, only 
organizations that were mentioned a total of five or more ttmes in the four combmed 
sources The resuliing 117 organizations were the most prominent organizations in the 
labor policy domain Knoke requested an mterview wtth each of these orgamzations, and 
successfully completed interviews with 115 organizations These 115 organizations 
include 20 labor unions, 28 business orgamzations, 10 professt0nal associations, 35 
public interest groups, 18 federal agencies/regulators, and four congressional groups 
The data set includes information on the organizations’activ山esrelated to 25 
legislative policy events. Policy events refer to cong問ssionallegislative bils. Usmg the 
Congressional hポormalto1tService annual abstracts, Knoke checked al legislative 
heanngs held仕om1981 through 1987 by (I) the House Committee on Education and 
Labor, (2) the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and (3) other 
com川町田whichheld several labor-related hearings. This mspection produced a list of 
137 hearings, which Knoke categorized into 79“scenarios”or“chains of rela胎devents" 
(Knoke et al. 1996, 74) Of the 79 events, he focused on 25 policy events for his 
inv回tigation.For details of these events, see Knoke et al. (1996). 
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Action Sets 
Using this data set, Knoke and Pappi (1991) and Knoke et al. (1996) identified 
networks of organizational actors involved in the 25 labor-policy bills mentioned 
above. 帥 Theycalled these organizational networks“action sets，”which refer to a type of 
coahtion involved m pohcy-making: 
An action set .・ consistsof those collective actor organizations that consciously 
coordinate activities on a particular event.・.All members prefer the same outcome 
for the event, are directly or indirectly linked in a communication network, and 
collaborate in lobbying and other activities to influence policy (Knoke and Pappi 
1991, 510). 
Knoke identified action sets associated with 25 policy events in the following manner. In 
regard to each policy event, informants of al organizations were shown a list of al 
domain actors (both interest groups and government organizations) and we問 askedto 
check organizations with which they fanned“a coalition to work together to reach the 
desired outcome.”Knoke and Pappi assumed that Organizatwn X worked wllh 
Organization Y m an action set if one of the followmg three conditions was met: (1) X 
阻portedthat 1t worked with Y; (2) Y reported that it worked with X; or (3) both X and Y 
mentioned an identical organization as the leader of a coalition they belonged to By 
examinrng action sets rn the labor policy domain, Knoke and Pappi (1991, 521) 
concluded，“In both the U S and G町many,national labor policy fights are typically 
orchestrated and conducted through action sets.”U.S. action s目swe肥 oftenled by the 
AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, or the National Association of Manufactures 
However, Knoke and Pappi did not examine what specific acto四 constitutedthese action 
sets, thus faihng to indicate whether these action sets possibly constituted iron triangles. 
They only問portedthat labor unions we肥田O田 likelythan other types of organizational 
acto目 top訂t1c1patein action sets. Thus, this article問 examinesKnoke’s action sets to 
venfy the p田senceor absence of iron triangles. 
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Fm dings 
Table I provides d田criplivedata on action sets associated with al 25 policy events. 
The問 are48 action sets associated with 25 policy events. For example, Event #2 is 
associated with one aclion set supporting the passage of出ebil. The members of the 
action set include only th問elabor unions Event #3 is associated with three action sets: 
two sets pushmg for the passage of the bil and one set opposing its passage The fim 
action set includes six labor unions and two public interest groups. The second action set 
includes 1 business orgamzations, two professional groups, one public inte回stgroup, 
four government agencies, and one congressional committee The third actton set 
includes日velabor unions and four public interest groups. As one can se, the presence 
and absence of action sets as well as the type of organizations in the sets vary depending 
upon policy events. These action sets are examined further to see whether they meet the 
three criteria of iron triangles presented above 
Criterion #1 
First, I examined whether each action set constitutes a triangle alliance, that is, 
whether an action set includes at least an interest group, an executive agency, and a 
congressional committee. Of the 48 action sets, only three町etriangle alliances. Other 
action sets lack at least one of the triangle actors. Thirty four action sets lack both 
cong町田tonaland executive-branch actors One action set lacks both an interest group 
and a congressional committee Stx acJion sets lack congressional committees. Four 
action sets lack interest groups Thus, only three action sets strictly meet the first 
criterion for iron triangles. These triangle alliances are associated with Evenls #3, #20, 
and #33. 
However, four policy events (#13, #29, #30, and #3 I) have two separate action sets 
on the same side of the policy issue that together contain al three triangle p町tiesThese 
action sets do not strictly meet the first criterion of iron triangles, because al three parties 
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are not問presentedin a single action set However, since two action sets with the same 
pahcy position may have been able to coordinate their actions m a weak fashion, these 
action sets are further analyzed as“semi-tnangle”alliances, as opposed to“genuine 
官iangle”alliances.
Critenon#2 
The seven triangle alliances (three genuine triangle alliances and four semi-triangle 
alliances) were fu巾 eranalyzed m tenns of the second criterion for iron triangles: that is, 
whether the triangle alliances include a stable, overlapping set of orgamzational 
participants. It was found that five organizations (three business organizations, one 
executive branch organization, and a congressional committee) had overlapping 
memberships in al seven triangle alliances. These orgamzations are: 
(1) American Farm Bureau Federation 
(2) Chamber of Commerce of the United State< 
(3) National Federation of Independent Busmess 
(4) Office of the Sec問 taryof L油or
(5) Republican members of House Labor & Education Committee 
The five organizations above出 presenttriangle acto四，andthey appe町 toconstitute core 
members of a possible iron triangle in the policy niche surroundmg the seven policy 
events The presence of these stable p町ticipantsmeets the second criterion. 
One important pomt to note is that the seven triangle alliances include not only the 
stable set of members mentioned above but also unstable, transient members. Eight 
organizations appear only once in the seven triangle alliances, and three organizations 
appear only twice in the triangle alliances This finding indicates that stable, overlapping 
members worked together with unstable, transient members on these events. 
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Criterion #3 
The seven triangle alliances were next examined as Io whether they meet Ihe 1h1rd 
criterion of iron triangles, that is, whether they controlled policy outcomes By 
examming the relationship between triangle alliance＇’desired policy p08itions and actual 
policy outcomes, we can te't whether the triangle alliance' controlled policy outcomes. 
For example, if a policy outcome is in opposite to the policy position taken by a triangle 
alliance, it is clear that the alliance members did not control the policy outcome. On the 
other hand, if the policy outcome is in line with the policy position of the triangle 
alliance, the alliance members may have controlled the policy outcome. 
See Table 2 for summary results on the seven triangle alliances regardmg their 
desired policy positions and actual policy outcomes. 
Table 2. Triangle Alliance and Policy Outcomes 
Event ID Event N皿＇＂ Am~ceTlE' Poliol Po,;1;0 Ouicome Wio o' Lo≪ 
#3 Joh Trnmmg Po'1n"・,/up Ac! Gooumo Fo' Passed Woo 
指13 Amendments to 1938 Fair Labor Scm Fo' fa;)ed Lost 
Standon1' Ac! 
#20 T"nage Sub」Ml”加umWage Gonume Fo' Failed Lost 
#29 Pam>tailD>rnbdlty lea" Sem; A gm mt Failed 'Woo 
#30 Rol,lng Minimum I拍＇ge Somo Agmo<t fa;)ed Woo 
が31 Adm附eNatlccaf Pia叫口阻哩 Somo Ag,;o.i p,,,.d Lost 
#33 St，ひ＞pp;,,gDauble-B"a"lng Gonume Ago;o.i Failed 、Won
Table 2 shows that a genuine甘ianglealliance was supporting the passage of Event 
#3 (Job Training Partnership Act), and the bil passed Thus, the triangle alliance won the 
policy fight. As for Event #13, a semi-triangle alliance was supporting the passage of 
Amendments to the 1938 Fa1r Labor Standards Act, but the bil failed to become law, 
indicating that the triangle alliance lost the policy fight. Event #20 shows that a genuine 
tnangle alhance was supportmg the teenage sub-minimum wage bil, and t failed to 
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become law. Again, a triangle alliance lost a policy fight. Events #29 and #30 show that 
the semi triangle alliances were opposmg the parental/disability leave act and a bil to 
increase minimum wage. Both bils failed to pass Thus, the tnangle alliances won both 
fights. Event #31 shows that a semi-triangle alliance was opposing the bil requiring the 
advance notice of a plant closing, but the bil passed Thus, the opposing alliance won the 
日ghtFmally, a genuine triangle alliance was opposing the passage of a bil (Event #33), 
which aimed to“stop‘double-b回asting’bycompanies setting up non-union subsidiaries 
to side step collective bargaining agreements" (Knoke et al. 1996, 257), and the bil 
failed to pass. The triangle alliance won the fight. 
Overall, triangle alliances won four policy日ghtsand lost three such fights Thus, 
they won about 60 percent of the policy fights. If we focus only on genuine triangle 
alliances, they won two policy fights and lost one. This result mdtcates that the triangle 
alliances did not totally control policy outcomes. Thus, the triangle alliances do not meet 
the third criterion of iron triangles. 
Opposing Alliances 
Because opposing alliances won three out of seven policy fights associated with 
triangle alliances, it is worth examining what types of groups constituted members of the 
opposing alliances and whether they included stable core members just as triangle 
alliances included stable core members It was found that the following five labor unions 
had overlappmg memberships in six or seven opposing alliances associated with the 
seven policy events: 
(I) AFL-CIO 
(2) Communications Worke四 ofAmenca 
(3) International Ladi€' Garment Workers Union 
(4) Service Employee International Union 
(5) United Auto Workers 
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The findmg indicates !hat, just as triangle alliances consisied of Slable core member 
orgamzat1ons which worked consisiently together in an attempt to control policy making, 
five labor unions also worked consistently together in an attempt to check the triangle 
alliances’dominance in labor policy-making. The labor unions engaged m well-
coordinated lobbying ac1ivit1es against the posilions taken by triangle alliances. 
Another finding to note is that just as triangle alliances included both stable and 
unstable membe四，opposingalliances also included unstable, transient members as well 
as stable membe四 Tenorganizations appeared in the opposing alliances only once or 
twice. This finding indicates that the five labor unions formed the stable core of opposing 
alliances and worked together with more unstable actors 
Summary and Conclusion 
ThJS article reexamined Knoke’s labor-policy data set to determine whether his 
“action sets”could have actually constituted iron triangles Three criter』aof iron triangles 
were formulated, and we問 testedagainst Knoke’s data. First, I found that, of the 25 
policy events examined, only seven events were associated with genuine or semi triangle 
alliances A m司orityof policy events were not associated with triangle alliances because 
they lacked government actors (executive agencies and/or congressional committees). 
Apparently, government actors maintained some distance from interest groups. One 
possible explanation for this tendency may be related to the characteristics of the Reagan 
administration, whicl】wasin power during the period examined m this article. Because 
labor policy was not a high-priority item for the Reagan adm1mstrat1on, government 
actors may not have been active participants in labor policy makmg events. This lack of 
interest in labor policy issues may have contributed to the minimal presence of 
government actors in the action sets 
Second, I examined whether the seven triangle 副Iiancesmet the second criterion of 
stable membership. I found that three business org叩 izations,the Office of the Sec問tarγ
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of Labor, and the House Labor and Education Committee (Republican members) were 
consistent members in the mangle al!tances. This finding indicates that a basic structure 
for a possible iron triangle did exist in a niche in the labor domain, attempting to control 
policy outcomes 
When the triangle al!tances were tested against the third criterion, I found that the 
triangle alliances were not able to totally control policy outcnmes Of the seven policy 
events, the triangle alliances won four policy fights but lost thtee, indicating that their 
chance of winning was about 60 percent. Appa問ntly，“pitchedbattles" were being fought 
in the labnr dorr】由民 asHeinz et al. described in their study (1993, 217). The田fore,the 
triangle alltances did not control poltcy outcomes. 
One main reason for the lack of control by the triangle alliances may be that 
opposing alliances presented effective counter mobilizations. An analysis of 
memberships of opposing alliances showed that five labor unions constituted stable core 
members and worked together with unstable actors on specific policy events. Thus, this 
consistent opposition led by core labor unions was effective in preventing triangle 
alliances from becoming an iron triangle 
The results indicate that iron triangles dtd not characterize the labor policy domain 
in the 1980s. Although the structural features of a possible iron triangle existed, the 
triangles actors were unable to dominate policy making, mamly because of intense, 
sustained lobbying activities by opposing groups Thus, the influence of a possible iron 
triangle was effectively counterbalanced by opposing alliances However, 1f opposing 
lobbying activities in the labor policy domain had been weak，出etrmogle 副Hancecould 
have become an iron tri叩 gleby freely exercising dominant power 
My finding implies that if there is a policy訂eacharactenzed by a lack of conflict, 
that is, a lack of consistent opposing groups, one may be able to observe iron tnangles in 
action. In fact, a lack of conflict may explain Adams' (1984) observation that U.S. 
defense policies are controlled by an iron triangle and Ripley and Franklin’s assertion 
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!hat iron triangles tend to exist m the distributive policy domain. These types of poli山田
rarely involve consistent organized opposition Thus, an absence of sustained organized 
opposition appears to help explain where iron triangles are likely to form. 
Notes 
(!) One problem with this study, however, is that they did not examine whethec organizatiooal 
triangle ac何回 formedexclusive alliances in regacd to specific legislative bils. They just 
inmtigated how close individual lobbyists are to different kinds of government officials in 
terms of social/pa凶sancharncteristics and regular contacts. 
(2) Since government of 日cialswere not included in the study of netwocks, it is not entirely clear 
whether they could have played a centrnl role in each dn ain. However, Heinz et al argued 
that this is not likely even if governrr ent officials wece included in the study. 
(3) See Knoke and Kaufman (1992) for specific details of this data set. 
(4) They also analyzed 32 Ge<man labor policy events 
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アメリカ労働政策と鉄の三角同盟
-1980年代の政策連携の分析
〈要約〉
石生義人
この論文は、アメリカ労働政策分野においてなぜ「鉄の三角同盟」現象が起
こっていないのかという疑問に答えようとするものである。 DavidKnokeが収集
したデータを再分析し、 1980年代の労働政策に関わった115の組織アクターの連
携にどのような特徴があったのかを調べている。具体的には、 25の労働関違法
案にかかわる組織連携にどのようなアクターが含まれていたのかを分析し、（I)
経済団体、（2）労働省のOfficeof the Secretary、（3）下院の労働・教育委員会（共
和党議員）が複数の法案に関して連携をしていることがわかった。この連携は
「鉄の三角同盟Jの構造的特徴は有しているが、どの程度政策結果に影響を与え
ているのかを調べてみると、これらの組織の政策方針と実際の政策結果が60%程
度しか一致していないことがわかった。つまり、「鉄の三角同盟」と呼べるほど
の影響力を行使していなかった。その主な理由は、労働団体を中心とする連携
が、効果的な反対ロビー活動を展開していたからである。「鉄の三角同盟」現象
は、連携を組む反対ロピー活動によってその影響力が弱められるため、敵対す
る組織連携がない政策分野においてのみ発生しやすいということが言える。
